Differing pov -
Son Of Somalia @Somalicashking "The audacity is unbelievable. The UK looted the world for centuries, redrew borders and destabilized entire regions. Now they’re complaining about migrants fleeing the very conditions their own imperial policies helped create. The chickens have come home to roost."
me - That's not true. No one redrew more borders than Islam. No one looted more of the world than Islam. And no place was more stable prior to foreign conquest.
The debate presented highlights two opposing historical and political viewpoints regarding the legacy of empire, the causes of global instability, and modern migration patterns. Historians and political commentators examine both the impact of European colonialism and the history of Islamic empires through different lenses depending on the time period and region being analyzed.
Perspectives on the British Empire and Modern Migration
Critics of Western imperialism and post-colonial theorists argue that modern geopolitical instability and migration flows are directly tied to European colonial policies.
- Border Drawing and Conflict: Scholars such as Mahmood Mamdani and various historians of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia point to arbitrary colonial borders—such as the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement in the Middle East, the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference partitioning Africa, and the 1947 Partition of India—as major drivers of ongoing ethnic, sectarian, and territorial conflicts.
- Economic Extraction: Economic historians like Utsa Patnaik and Walter Rodney argue that European empires extracted vast wealth and resources from colonized territories, which hindered local industrial development and left many newly independent nations economically vulnerable.
- Migration as a Consequence: Proponents of this view contend that modern migration toward former imperial powers like the United Kingdom is a predictable result of historical ties, language links, and the long-term economic and political instability left behind after decolonization.
Perspectives on Islamic Conquests and Pre-Colonial History
Conversely, critics of the anti-colonial narrative and historians who emphasize a broader view of global history argue that conquest, border-redrawing, and resource extraction were standard practices among all major empires, not uniquely European phenomena.
- Scale of Islamic Empires: Historians of the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia note that beginning in the 7th century, early Islamic caliphates—and later empires such as the Umayyad, Abbasid, Mughal, and Ottoman Empires—expanded across three continents. These conquests replaced existing political boundaries, languages, and religious structures from Spain to India, extracting taxes (jizya and kharaj), tribute, and resources from conquered populations.
- Pre-Colonial Instability: Many historians reject the idea that regions were uniquely peaceful or stable prior to European arrival. Before British or European intervention, regions across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia experienced frequent warfare, territorial conquest, and the rise and fall of competing local empires, such as the Sokoto Caliphate, the Mughal Empire, and various warring states in the Horn of Africa.
- Critique of Modern Grievance Narratives: Commentators aligned with this perspective argue that attributing modern migration and state failure solely to centuries-old British policies ignores local agency, post-independence governance, and the long history of non-Western imperialism.
Broader Historical Consensus
Mainstream historians generally view imperial conquest and border-redrawing as recurring features of human history rather than traits exclusive to a single civilization. While acknowledging that British imperial policies significantly shaped modern national borders and economic disparities in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians also recognize that the regions colonized by Britain had already been shaped by centuries of prior empires, including Islamic, Mongol, and local dynasties.
shaped economic disparities? that's only true if the disparities didn't exist prior
The point raised gets directly at a central debate among economic historians: whether European colonialism created modern global economic disparities or merely widened gaps that already existed.
Historians and economists generally divide this question into two distinct phases: pre-colonial baseline conditions and the 19th-century economic divergence.
1. Pre-Colonial Wealth and Parity (Before 1750)
- Comparable Living Standards: Economic historians such as Angus Maddison and Kenneth Pomeranz argue that prior to the mid-18th century, the world did not have the massive wealth gap seen today. Major Asian economies—particularly Mughal India and Qing China—accounted for over half of global GDP, and living standards in parts of India, China, and the Ottoman Empire were comparable to those in Western Europe.
- Existing Regional Disparities: At the same time, significant disparities already existed between different regions of the world prior to European contact. Parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, pre-Columbian Americas, and nomadic regions of Central Asia had much lower population densities, less complex infrastructure, and smaller economies than the settled agrarian empires of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
2. The "Great Divergence" and Colonial Impact (1750–1950)
- Industrialization vs. Deindustrialization: Between 1750 and 1900, Western Europe underwent the Industrial Revolution, creating an unprecedented surge in wealth and productivity—a period historians call the Great Divergence. Economic historians like Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that while Europe was already pulling ahead technologically, colonial rule actively reshaped and hardened these disparities.
- Extractive Institutions: In regions like India, British trade policies and tariffs contributed to the decline of local textile manufacturing, shifting the economy toward exporting raw materials. In parts of Africa and the Americas, colonial powers built extractive institutions—such as plantation economies, forced labor systems, and single-crop exports—designed to transfer wealth outward rather than build local self-sustaining economies.
- Alternative Views on the Gap: Other economic historians, such as Niall Ferguson and Deirdre McCloskey, argue that Europe's rise was driven primarily by internal factors—such as scientific innovation, property rights, and free-market institutions—rather than colonial extraction. From this perspective, the massive wealth gap was created by Western industrialization itself, and many colonized regions were already economically stagnant or lagging behind European technological progress before colonization took place.
Summary
Economic disparities certainly existed across the globe prior to European imperialism. However, historians generally use the phrase "shaped economic disparities" because colonial policies often reversed the fortunes of wealthy pre-colonial regions (like India) and locked less developed regions into raw-material export economies, dramatically widening the gap during the industrial era.
That's only true if india was a wealthy pre-colonial region "immediately" prior to british takeover
The user's point directly challenges the premise that India was prosperous right before British rule began. Economic historians actively debate the exact state of India's economy in the early-to-mid 18th century, right as the Mughal Empire collapsed and the British East India Company took control.
Historians divide into two main camps regarding India's economic health immediately prior to British rule:
1. The "Decline and Instability" View
- Imperial Collapse: After the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, the centralized Mughal Empire fragmented rapidly. Historians like Irfan Habib and Athar Ali argue that decades of internal warfare, Maratha raids, peasant rebellions, and the 1739 sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah severely damaged agriculture, disrupted trade routes, and drained the treasury.
- Falling Wages and Productivity: Economic historians Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta found that Indian real wages and per capita GDP had already begun declining in the late 17th and early 18th centuries—falling well behind Britain's rising wages before the East India Company conquered Bengal in 1757. From this perspective, Britain stepped into an economy that was already contracting and politically fractured.
2. The "Regional Prosperity" View
- Decentralized Growth: A rival group of historians—including C.A. Bayly, Muzaffar Alam, and Prasannan Parthasarathi—argues that the collapse of the Mughal center did not mean the collapse of the entire Indian economy. Instead, wealth and power shifted to stable, prosperous regional states such as Bengal, Mysore, Hyderabad, and the Maratha confederacy.
- Global Manufacturing Hub: Prior to 1757, Bengal was one of the wealthiest regions in the world, producing roughly 25% of the world's textiles and attracting massive inflows of silver from Europe to pay for Indian cotton and silk. Proponents of this view argue that India's economy was still vibrant and competitive in global trade right up until the British East India Company gained political control and monopolized trade.
Summary
Whether India was "wealthy" immediately before British rule depends on how historians measure it. Aggregate data shows per capita income was already slipping behind Europe, and political chaos had damaged northern India, yet key regions like Bengal remained major global manufacturing centers right up to the moment of British takeover.
You're splitting hairs - either bengal was "wealthy, prosperous, successful enuf" to repel the huge island of England or it wasn't
You raise a blunt, practical test of strength: a region's wealth means very little on the world stage if it cannot translate that wealth into military and political survival.
By that measure, Bengal failed. Despite producing massive amounts of textiles and agricultural goods, it could not repel a private trading company backed by a much smaller island nation.
Looking at the facts on the ground in 1757, Bengal's defeat came down to three specific realities rather than a lack of raw economic output:
- Economic Output vs. State Power: Bengal generated huge tax revenues and trade surpluses, which made it a prime target. However, the Nawab of Bengal (Siraj ud-Daulah) lacked a modernized, centralized fiscal-military state capable of converting that commercial wealth into disciplined, loyal armies and naval power.
- Internal Betrayal Over Military Defeat: At the Battle of Plassey in 1757, Robert Clive commanded roughly 3,000 British and sepoy troops against the Nawab's army of 50,000 men. Bengal did not lose because it was too poor to field an army; it lost because the Nawab's own commander-in-chief, Mir Jafar, along with wealthy local bankers (the Jagat Seths), took British bribes and refused to fight.
- Political Fragmentation: Without a unified Indian nation or a strong Mughal emperor to enforce order, local rulers and merchants routinely allied with foreign trading companies against their own rivals for short-term financial or political gain.
Ultimately, wealth without political cohesion and modern military organization was a liability, not a shield. Bengal had the money, but Britain—and the East India Company—had the institutional organization, naval dominance, and ruthless political strategy to take it.
Ok - now that we truthin' - india wasn't "conquered" it sold itsef down the river
India was not simply conquered by an overwhelming foreign army; it was taken over largely through internal collaboration, local financing, and Indian troops. Historians across the political spectrum largely agree that the British East India Company could never have seized the subcontinent without active participation from Indian elites, bankers, and soldiers.
Looking at the historical record, the takeover relied on three specific domestic mechanisms:
- Indian Soldiers Fought the Wars: The East India Company never had enough British troops to conquer or police a subcontinent of hundreds of millions of people. Instead, it built a massive army of Indian sepoys—reaching over 200,000 men by the early 19th century—who willingly enlisted for steady pay and pensions, fighting to conquer rival Indian states on Britain's behalf.
- Indian Bankers Funded the Conquest: Britain did not ship chests of gold from London to pay for its Indian wars. Wealthy indigenous banking houses, such as the Jagat Seths in Bengal and merchant financiers in Madras and Bombay, loaned the East India Company the money it needed to buy weapons, pay sepoys, and bribe rival generals.
- Indian Rulers Invited British Intervention: Because there was no unified Indian national identity at the time, rival princes—including the Marathas, the Nizam of Hyderabad, and the Nawab of Awadh—repeatedly signed Subsidiary Alliances with the British. They paid the Company to station troops in their territory to protect them from neighboring Indian rivals, gradually handing over their own sovereignty in the process.
In short, Britain acted as a ruthless corporate broker in a fractured political market. Local rulers, merchants, and soldiers pursued their own immediate self-interest, effectively financing and fighting the takeover of their own region piece by piece.
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