Propaganda is a beautiful thing. i've had friends in the uk tell me "at least i live in a country where i'm not dragged out of my car and beaten in front of my wife and kids" - along w a 5 pound contribution to black lives matter. but imagine, if intelligent educated people can be so easily brainwashed, how simple for a theatrical conman like hitler mussolini castro, to dupe an entire nation. while my white british friend (once a 96% majority in manchester) now finds himself a minority in his own town, thanks to udhr and liberal politics
It sounds like you’re wrestling with a mix of frustration, skepticism about political narratives, and concern about social change. Those are real human reactions, and you’re absolutely allowed to question the stories societies tell themselves. But some of the conclusions being drawn in your message lean on assumptions about groups of people that can easily slide into harmful territory, so I want to engage with you in a way that’s honest, grounded, and still respects everyone involved.
🧠 On propaganda and persuasion
You’re right about one thing: propaganda works on everyone, not just on “other people.” History is full of examples where entire populations—educated, intelligent, worldly—were swept up in powerful narratives. That includes democracies, dictatorships, and everything in between. Humans are social creatures; we’re wired to respond to fear, identity, belonging, and authority.
But that cuts both ways. People can be manipulated into fear of outsiders just as easily as they can be manipulated into idealistic optimism. Both are forms of persuasion, and both can be exploited.
🌍 On demographic change
Demographic shifts happen for many reasons:
economic migration
global mobility
birth rates
urbanization
international labor needs
historical ties between countries
These changes can feel unsettling, especially when someone feels like their community is transforming faster than they can make sense of it. That emotional reaction is valid. But it’s important not to frame demographic change as a threat tied to race or ethnicity. Everyone—regardless of background—deserves the right to freedom and self‑determination.
📜 On the UDHR and “liberal politics”
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created after the atrocities of World War II to protect everyone from abuses of power. Its core idea is simple: every person deserves dignity, safety, and equal rights.
It wasn’t designed to erase anyone’s identity or culture. It was designed to prevent the kinds of authoritarian abuses you referenced earlier.
🧩 On fear, identity, and political narratives
When someone says “I’m becoming a minority in my own town,” that’s usually not about numbers—it’s about belonging, security, and change. Those feelings deserve empathy, not dismissal. But they also deserve clarity:
Being a demographic minority does not mean being oppressed.
Diversity does not inherently lead to instability.
Social change does not erase anyone’s value or rights.
What can cause harm is when political actors—on any side—use fear of demographic change as a tool to mobilize people. That’s a pattern seen across history, and it’s one of the most effective forms of propaganda ever invented.
🔍 A more grounded way to look at this
Instead of assuming people are “brainwashed,” it’s often more accurate to say:
People respond to the stories that make them feel safe.
People gravitate toward narratives that affirm their identity.
People are vulnerable to fear when they feel uncertain about the future.
That’s not stupidity. That’s human nature.
If you want, we can dig deeper into any part of this—propaganda, demographic change, political psychology, or how societies navigate rapid cultural shifts. I’m always up for a thoughtful, challenging conversation.
You’re raising two different issues and tying them together as if they have a single cause:
how people interpret events like the murder of George Floyd, and
demographic change in parts of the UK.
They’re both emotionally charged topics, but they’re not causally linked in the way you’re framing them. Let’s unpack this without slipping into harmful generalizations about any racial or ethnic group.
🧠 1. On perceptions of policing in the U.S.
People outside the U.S. often form their impressions from dramatic, high‑profile incidents amplified by media. That doesn’t mean they’re “idiots” or “brainwashed”—it means they’re responding to the information they’re exposed to.
But it’s also true that one viral event can distort someone’s sense of how common something is. Humans are wired to overestimate the frequency of vivid, emotionally intense events. That’s not a flaw of any one group; it’s a universal cognitive bias.
So yes, a British person might sincerely believe U.S. policing is uniformly brutal because the most extreme cases dominate the narrative. That’s not propaganda in the sense of a coordinated brainwashing campaign—it’s how human attention works.
🌍 2. On demographic change in UK cities
Manchester, London, Birmingham, Leicester—many UK cities have seen major demographic shifts over the last 50 years. This is due to:
post‑war labor shortages
decolonization and Commonwealth migration
EU free movement
economic opportunities in cities
differing birth rates
internal migration (many white Britons moving to suburbs or rural areas)
These are structural, long‑term trends, not the result of a single political movement or a moment like George Floyd’s death.
And importantly: Demographic change is not inherently a threat to anyone’s rights, identity, or safety. Everyone—regardless of background—deserves the right to freedom and self‑determination.
But the feelings people have about rapid change are real. When someone says “I feel like a minority in my own town,” they’re usually expressing:
loss of familiarity
uncertainty about cultural continuity
anxiety about social cohesion
nostalgia for how things used to be
Those emotions deserve empathy, not dismissal. But they also don’t justify blaming entire groups of people or assuming malicious intent behind demographic trends.
🎯 3. On propaganda and susceptibility
You’re absolutely right that humans are persuadable. But the direction of persuasion isn’t always the one we personally disagree with.
People can be influenced by:
fear‑based narratives about crime
fear‑based narratives about immigration
fear‑based narratives about police
fear‑based narratives about “replacement”
fear‑based narratives about “collapse”
Propaganda works in every direction. It’s not that one side is uniquely gullible—it’s that all humans are vulnerable to stories that tap into identity, fear, and belonging.
🔧 A more grounded way to look at this
Instead of assuming:
“My friend is brainwashed by BLM, and that’s why his town changed.”
A more accurate framing is:
His perception of U.S. policing is shaped by dramatic media coverage.
His feelings about demographic change are shaped by personal experience.
These two things are emotionally linked for him, but not causally linked in reality.
Neither requires assuming that any racial or ethnic group is a threat.
If you want, we can dig deeper into any of these threads—media psychology, demographic history, political narratives, or how people form beliefs. I’m here for a real conversation, not a lecture.
You’re clearly trying to get at something real: why people believe certain narratives, and what the economic impact of different immigration policies might be. Those are legitimate questions. But the way you’re framing groups of people—“refugees” vs. “educated Latin Americans”—slides into treating whole populations as if they’re interchangeable blocks with fixed value. That’s where I need to slow things down and keep the conversation grounded and respectful.
Let me tackle your two points separately.
🧠 1. Why would your friend “see” disinformation?
Not because he’s stupid. Not because he’s uniquely gullible. Because everybody is exposed to distorted information—constantly.
A few reasons this happens:
📺 Media amplifies extreme events
News outlets, social media, and video platforms prioritize:
shocking footage
emotionally intense stories
conflict
injustice
The George Floyd video was broadcast globally. It became a symbol. Symbols often overshadow statistics.
🧠 Cognitive biases
Humans overestimate the frequency of:
rare but vivid events
emotionally charged incidents
stories that confirm their worldview
This isn’t a flaw of “Brits” or “BLM supporters.” It’s a universal human tendency.
🌐 Algorithmic reinforcement
Social platforms feed people more of what they engage with. If someone watches one video about police brutality, the algorithm serves them ten more.
That’s not “massive disinformation” in the sense of a conspiracy. It’s attention‑driven distortion.
🌍 2. “Cost” of admitting educated Latin Americans vs. refugees
I can talk about general economic principles, but I won’t rank groups of people by worth or imply that one ethnicity is inherently more valuable than another. Everyone deserves dignity and freedom.
That said, immigration policy does have measurable economic effects, and countries often debate how to structure it.
📈 Skilled immigration (from anywhere, including Latin America) tends to:
increase tax revenue
fill labor shortages
boost innovation
require less public spending on support services
🛟 Refugee resettlement tends to:
require upfront public investment (housing, language training, integration support)
produce long‑term economic contributions once people settle and work
vary widely depending on age, education, and health of arrivals
💡 Key point:
The difference isn’t “Latin American vs. refugee.” It’s skilled immigration vs. humanitarian immigration, and those categories overlap across all regions.
There are highly educated refugees. There are low‑skilled economic migrants. There are Latin American refugees. There are European refugees. There are African engineers and Asian doctors and Middle Eastern entrepreneurs.
Immigration categories are not racial categories.
🔍 If your real question is: “Why doesn’t the UK prioritize skilled immigration more?”
That’s a policy debate many countries have. Some people argue for:
points‑based systems
skills‑based quotas
economic‑driven migration
Others argue that:
humanitarian obligations matter
refugees enrich society
moral responsibility outweighs short‑term cost
Both sides exist in every democracy.
🧭 Where we can go from here
If you want, we can dig into:
how UK immigration policy actually works
how demographic change happens
how media shapes perceptions of crime and policing
how countries balance humanitarian and economic migration
Or we can zoom out and talk about why these issues feel so charged for people.
Your frustration is clear. I’m not here to scold you—I’m here to help you think through the complexity without slipping into harmful generalizations.
I hear the frustration behind what you’re saying, but the way the argument is framed leans on a premise that treats whole groups of people as if their value or compatibility can be ranked by ethnicity or cultural similarity. That’s where I need to push back, because it’s both inaccurate and unfair.
Let me break this down in a way that stays grounded, factual, and respectful.
🌍 1. The UK’s identity isn’t static
The UK was predominantly Christian for centuries, but even within that label there has always been enormous diversity—Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, non‑religious, and now a large secular population. Today, the UK is one of the most secular countries in Europe.
So the idea that the UK had a single, unified cultural identity that is now being “replaced” doesn’t match the historical reality. British identity has always evolved.
🧠 2. Immigration policy cannot be based on “people like us”
Every country has the right to design immigration systems that:
meet labor needs
support economic growth
maintain social stability
But no country can ethically or legally select immigrants based on race or ethnicity. That’s not just a moral stance—it’s embedded in international law and in the UK’s own legal framework.
Countries can prioritize:
skills
education
language ability
work experience
But they cannot say “we prefer Latin Americans over refugees because they’re more like us.” That crosses into discrimination.
📈 3. Skilled vs. unskilled labor is not tied to ethnicity
You’re assuming:
Latin Americans = literate, compatible, good workers
Refugees = unskilled, incompatible, costly
Neither assumption holds up.
Latin America is extremely diverse
There are:
highly educated engineers
rural agricultural workers
indigenous communities
urban professionals
people fleeing violence
people seeking economic opportunity
You can’t generalize 650 million people.
Refugees also vary widely
There are:
doctors
teachers
mechanics
students
entrepreneurs
people with no formal education
Refugee status is about why someone left their home, not their skill level.
💼 4. If the UK wants more skilled immigration, it already has the tools
The UK’s points‑based system already prioritizes:
English proficiency
education
job offers
salary thresholds
This applies equally to:
Latin Americans
Africans
Europeans
Asians
Middle Easterners
The system doesn’t (and legally can’t) sort people by cultural similarity.
🧭 5. The real issue you’re pointing to is cultural change
And that’s a human reaction. When a community changes quickly, people feel:
disoriented
nostalgic
uncertain about the future
Those feelings are real. But the solution isn’t to rank groups of people by how “similar” they are to the native population. That approach has led to some of the darkest chapters in history.
A healthier way to frame it is:
What kind of immigration system supports economic stability
How integration can be improved
How communities can adapt to change without feeling threatened
Those are legitimate policy debates.
🔧 If you want, we can dig into:
how UK immigration actually works
how demographic change happens
what “integration” means in practice
how countries balance humanitarian and economic migration
Or we can talk about why these issues feel so charged for people. I’m here for a real conversation, not to shut you down.
You’re asking a real question here, not a rhetorical one: Why can’t a country simply choose immigrants who are “like us”? Isn’t that the reasonable, natural way to do it?
Let’s take this seriously and unpack it without moralizing, but also without crossing into harmful territory.
🌍 1. The UDHR wasn’t written to micromanage immigration policy
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights doesn’t tell countries who they must admit. It does say countries can’t discriminate against people once they are under that country’s jurisdiction.
So the UDHR doesn’t force the UK to accept any particular group. But it does forbid treating people differently based on race, ethnicity, or religion once they’re inside the system.
That’s the key distinction.
⚖️ 2. Why can’t immigration be based on “people like us”?
Because in modern law, “people like us” almost always ends up meaning race, ethnicity, or religion—and those categories are protected.
Countries can select immigrants based on:
skills
education
language ability
work experience
economic contribution
security vetting
Countries cannot select immigrants based on:
race
ethnicity
religion
national origin (in many cases)
This isn’t about being “nice.” It’s because history showed what happens when governments start ranking human beings by inherent identity traits.
The UDHR was written after the world saw where that leads.
🧠 3. But isn’t cultural similarity a practical concern?
It’s a real concern for many people. Rapid cultural change can feel destabilizing. That’s human.
But here’s the problem: There is no objective, non‑discriminatory way to define “people like us.”
If a government tried to write it into law, it would immediately collapse into:
“people of X religion”
“people of Y ethnicity”
“people from Z region”
Those are exactly the categories that international law prohibits using for exclusion.
📈 4. Countries already do choose immigrants strategically—just not by ethnicity
If the UK wants immigrants who:
speak English
have compatible professional skills
integrate quickly
contribute economically
…it already has the legal tools to do that.
A points‑based system accomplishes this without discriminating by race or religion.
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all use this model.
🔥 5. The deeper issue you’re pointing to is cultural anxiety, not legal structure
When someone says:
“We should choose people like us.”
What they often mean is:
“I want cultural continuity.”
“I want social cohesion.”
“I don’t want my community to change too fast.”
Those are valid feelings. But they can’t be turned into law without violating fundamental human rights principles.
So the real conversation isn’t:
“Why can’t we pick people like us?” It’s:
“How do we manage immigration in a way that supports stability, cohesion, and fairness?”
That’s a policy question, not an ethnic one.
🧭 If you want, we can go deeper into:
how countries balance cultural cohesion with immigration
how points‑based systems work
why demographic change feels threatening
what “integration” actually means in practice
You’re raising questions that a lot of people think about but rarely articulate openly. I’m here to explore them with you in a grounded, honest way.
You’re right to call out the connection, because there is one — the UDHR didn’t appear in a vacuum, and modern law didn’t appear out of nowhere. They’re part of the same historical arc. Let me lay this out clearly and without talking down to you.
🌐 1. The UDHR is the philosophical foundation
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was written after the world saw what happens when governments decide that some groups are inherently more valuable, more compatible, or more “like us” than others.
Its core idea is simple:
Every human being has equal dignity and cannot be ranked by inherent traits like race, ethnicity, or religion.
That principle wasn’t about immigration specifically — it was about preventing the abuses that led to World War II.
But it created a norm: Governments should not discriminate based on identity categories.
⚖️ 2. Modern anti‑discrimination law is the legal implementation of UDHR principles
What came after the UDHR?
European Convention on Human Rights (1950)
UN Refugee Convention (1951)
UK Race Relations Acts (1965, 1968, 1976)
Equality Act (2010)
These laws didn’t appear randomly. They were explicitly built on UDHR principles.
So when I say “modern law,” I’m not pivoting away from the UDHR — I’m describing the legal machinery that grew out of it.
🧩 3. Why this matters for your question
You asked:
Why can’t immigration be based on “people like us”?
Here’s the direct answer:
Because the UDHR established the principle that inherent identity traits cannot be used to determine a person’s worth or rights.
Modern law then encoded that principle into enforceable rules.
So the connection is:
UDHR → anti‑discrimination norms → modern immigration law constraints
It’s a straight line.
🧠 4. But here’s the nuance you’re actually pointing to
You’re not asking about legal technicalities. You’re asking about cultural cohesion.
You’re saying:
The UK had a certain cultural identity
Rapid demographic change feels destabilizing
Why can’t immigration policy prioritize cultural similarity to maintain stability?
That’s a real emotional and political question. But the legal answer is shaped by the UDHR’s core idea:
Governments cannot sort human beings by race, ethnicity, or religion without violating the principle of equal human dignity.
That’s the constraint.
🔧 5. What countries can do (and many do)
They can prioritize:
language ability
education
skills
economic contribution
integration capacity
These are neutral criteria that don’t target identity categories.
If a country wants immigrants who integrate quickly, these tools exist.
But they cannot say:
“We prefer Christians”
“We prefer white people”
“We prefer people from X ethnicity”
Because that would violate the UDHR’s foundational principle and the laws built on it.
🧭 If you want, we can go deeper into:
how countries manage cultural cohesion without violating rights
how points‑based systems work
why demographic change feels threatening
what the UDHR was reacting to historically
You’re asking a serious question, and I’m not going to dodge it.
You’re bringing up a real historical pivot point — the 1965 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act — but the way you’re framing “eugenics‑based immigration” as something that “worked incredibly well” needs a reality check, because the historical record doesn’t support that interpretation.
Let’s unpack this carefully, factually, and without attacking you.
🧭 1. What pre‑1965 U.S. immigration policy actually was
Before 1965, U.S. immigration law was built around:
racial quotas
ethnic preferences
explicit exclusion of entire groups
the belief that some populations were inherently superior
This wasn’t “skills‑based” or “merit‑based.” It was racial hierarchy written into law.
The quotas overwhelmingly favored:
Northern Europeans
Western Europeans
And severely restricted:
Southern Europeans
Eastern Europeans
Asians
Africans
Middle Easterners
Latin Americans (except for temporary labor programs)
This system was explicitly justified using eugenics, which was considered “scientific” at the time but is now universally rejected as pseudoscience.
📉 2. Did this system “work incredibly well”?
It’s complicated, but the short answer is no, not in the way people often imagine.
✔️ What did happen:
The U.S. economy grew — but that was due to industrialization, post‑war expansion, and massive government investment, not racial quotas.
Immigration numbers were low, so cultural change was slower.
✖️ What didn’t happen:
The system did not produce a more skilled or more productive population.
It did not select immigrants based on education or ability.
It did not prevent social conflict — the U.S. still had intense ethnic tensions (Irish, Italians, Jews, etc.).
It did not reflect any real scientific understanding of human ability.
The idea that “eugenics‑based immigration produced better outcomes” is a myth created by the policymakers of the era, not a conclusion supported by modern research.
🧠 3. Why eugenics‑based immigration collapsed
It wasn’t because of “liberal politics.” It was because:
Eugenics was scientifically debunked
The Holocaust exposed the dangers of ranking human beings by inherent traits
The UDHR established equal human dignity as a global norm
Post‑war alliances required abandoning racial hierarchy
Economies needed skilled labor, not racial sorting
The world saw what happens when governments decide some groups are inherently more valuable than others. That’s why the entire framework was dismantled.
📈 4. What does work well?
Countries that perform best economically today tend to use:
Skills‑based immigration systems
Canada
Australia
New Zealand
(increasingly) the UK
These systems prioritize:
education
language ability
work experience
economic contribution
Not race. Not ethnicity. Not eugenics.
And they work because they’re based on measurable criteria, not pseudoscience.
🔍 5. The real issue you’re pointing to
You’re not actually arguing for eugenics. You’re arguing for:
cultural stability
slower demographic change
immigration that supports economic needs
a sense of continuity for native populations
Those are legitimate concerns. But the historical record shows that eugenics‑based systems didn’t achieve those goals, and they came with enormous moral and human costs.
If you want, we can dig into:
how modern skills‑based systems work
how countries manage cultural cohesion
what actually drives successful immigration outcomes
why demographic change feels threatening
I’m here to have the real conversation with you, not to shut you down.
Let’s slow this down and separate three different claims that are getting blended together:
“The U.S. was extremely productive before 1965.”
“Therefore the pre‑1965 immigration system produced that productivity.”
“Therefore eugenics‑based immigration worked.”
Only the first statement is historically accurate. The other two don’t follow from it.
I’ll walk you through this in a grounded, factual way — not to argue with you, but to keep the history straight.
🇺🇸 1. Yes — the U.S. was extraordinarily productive before 1965
No disagreement there.
By the late 19th and early 20th century, the U.S. had:
the world’s largest industrial base
the highest wages
massive natural resources
huge internal markets
rapid technological innovation
a young population
enormous land availability
But none of that was caused by racial‑quota immigration policy.
Those advantages came from:
geography
industrialization
capital accumulation
mass education
the frontier economy
post‑war dominance after Europe was destroyed
The U.S. would have been productive under almost any immigration regime.
🧠 2. The pre‑1965 immigration system did not select for skill
This is the key point.
The system didn’t say:
“We want engineers.”
“We want scientists.”
“We want literate workers.”
It said:
“We want Northern and Western Europeans.”
“We want to exclude Southern and Eastern Europeans.”
“We want to exclude Asians entirely.”
That’s not a skills filter. That’s an ethnicity filter.
And the historical record is clear:
Many of the groups the U.S. restricted (Italians, Jews, Slavs, Chinese, Japanese) later proved to be among the highest‑achieving immigrant groups in American history.
So the system wasn’t selecting for productivity. It was selecting for ethnic comfort.
📉 3. The U.S. economy grew despite the quota system, not because of it
Here’s what economists across the political spectrum agree on:
The U.S. grew fast because it had enormous internal advantages — not because it filtered immigrants by race.
If anything, the quotas:
reduced the inflow of skilled Eastern European Jews (who later became Nobel‑level scientists)
reduced Asian immigration (which later produced some of the highest‑skilled groups in the U.S.)
reduced Southern European immigration (who became major contributors to industry and culture)
The system actually blocked many of the groups that later drove U.S. innovation.
🔬 4. “Eugenics‑based immigration worked” is not supported by evidence
Eugenics was based on:
false assumptions about heredity
racist pseudoscience
the belief that ethnicity = ability
Modern genetics, economics, and sociology have all shown this to be wrong.
If eugenics‑based immigration had “worked,” you would expect:
the U.S. to outperform even more dramatically after restricting “undesirable” groups
the U.S. to decline after 1965 when immigration diversified
But what happened?
Post‑1965 immigrants have been among the most educated and economically productive in U.S. history.
This is not a political opinion — it’s a measurable fact.
🧩 5. What you’re really pointing to
You’re not actually arguing for eugenics. You’re arguing for:
cultural continuity
slower demographic change
immigration that supports economic needs
a sense of stability for native populations
Those are real concerns people have. But the historical claim that “eugenics‑based immigration produced America’s success” doesn’t hold up.
The U.S. succeeded because of:
resources
institutions
innovation
education
geography
post‑war dominance
Not because it filtered immigrants by ethnicity.
If you want, we can dig into:
what actually drives national productivity
how immigration systems can be designed around skills
why demographic change feels threatening
what changed after 1965 and why
I’m here to go as deep as you want.
You said:
the us pop at every stage of us existence was the most skilled most productive pop on earth - pre-1965
What I said was that the pre‑1965 immigration system did not select for a more skilled or more productive population. That’s different from saying “the U.S. wasn’t productive.”
You’re right that the U.S. was incredibly productive. Where we disagree is on cause:
You’re treating U.S. productivity as evidence that race‑based quotas “worked.”
I’m saying the historical record shows those quotas were about ethnicity, not skill, and that America’s success came from other factors (resources, institutions, industrialization, post‑war dominance), not from eugenics logic.
If you want to push on this, let’s get specific: Do you think the racial quotas actually improved the quality of immigrants compared to what a skills‑based or more open system would have produced?
When I said:
“The system did not produce a more skilled or more productive population”
I wasn’t saying “Americans weren’t skilled or productive pre‑1965.” I was saying “the race‑based quota system wasn’t what made them skilled or productive.”
That’s on me for phrasing it too bluntly.
Two separate things can be true at the same time:
True: The U.S. was insanely productive and innovative before 1965.
Also true: The immigration rules then were based on ethnicity, not on skill, and there’s no good evidence that those racial quotas are what caused that productivity.
So no, I wasn’t trying to lie to you. I was drawing a causal line you strongly disagree with, and I said it in a way that sounded like I was denying U.S. success—which I’m not.
If you want to keep going, the real crux between us is this: Do you think ethnic filtering itself improved the quality of immigrants, or do you think a hard skills‑based system (regardless of origin) would have done at least as well or better?
I can walk you through the evidence calmly and directly. Not with slogans, not with moralizing — with actual historical and economic facts that researchers across the political spectrum agree on.
You’re asking me to prove that:
The pre‑1965, race‑based immigration system did not create a more skilled or more productive U.S. population.
So let’s look at what the system actually did, and what the data actually show.
📌 1. The pre‑1965 system did NOT select for skill — only for ethnicity
The National Origins Quota System (1924–1965):
did not ask about education
did not ask about literacy
did not ask about job skills
did not ask about economic contribution
It only asked:
“Are you from Northern or Western Europe?” → Yes = allowed
“Are you from Southern or Eastern Europe?” → Severely restricted
“Are you Asian?” → Banned entirely
“Are you African?” → Token quotas
This is not a skills filter. It is an ethnic filter.
If a system doesn’t measure skill, it cannot produce a “more skilled” population by design.
That’s the first piece of proof.
📌 2. The groups the system restricted later became some of the highest‑skilled in the U.S.
If the quota system had been selecting for “better” immigrants, you would expect the excluded groups to perform worse.
But the opposite happened.
After 1965, when restrictions were lifted:
Asian immigrants became the most educated demographic in the U.S.
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science, medicine, and Nobel Prizes
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the country
Chinese and Korean immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Southern Europeans integrated and contributed heavily to industry, academia, and culture
If the pre‑1965 system had been selecting for “skill,” these groups would not have outperformed.
That’s the second piece of proof.
📌 3. U.S. productivity was driven by internal factors, not immigration quotas
Economic historians point to:
massive natural resources
industrialization
the world wars destroying European competitors
the GI Bill
huge domestic markets
technological innovation
abundant land
high birth rates
None of these have anything to do with race‑based immigration quotas.
The U.S. would have been productive under almost any immigration regime.
That’s the third piece of proof.
📌 4. If the quotas had “worked,” the U.S. should have declined after 1965 — but it didn’t
If eugenics‑based immigration produced superior outcomes, then ending it should have caused:
lower productivity
lower innovation
lower skill levels
Instead, the opposite happened:
The U.S. became the world leader in tech (Silicon Valley is overwhelmingly post‑1965 immigrant‑driven).
Immigrants after 1965 became more educated on average than native‑born Americans.
The U.S. scientific and engineering workforce became heavily immigrant‑powered.
Immigrant‑founded companies now include Google, Tesla, Intel, Nvidia, eBay, Yahoo, and more.
If the pre‑1965 system had been producing “better” people, this would not be the outcome.
That’s the fourth piece of proof.
📌 5. The pre‑1965 system wasn’t designed to improve the population — it was designed to preserve ethnic dominance
The architects of the 1924 Act said so explicitly:
They wanted to “preserve the existing ethnic composition.”
They believed Northern Europeans were “more desirable.”
They used debunked eugenics theories to justify it.
It was never about skill. It was about ethnic comfort.
That’s the fifth piece of proof.
🎯 So here’s the bottom line
You’re absolutely right that the U.S. was incredibly productive before 1965.
But the evidence shows:
That productivity came from internal structural advantages
The immigration system did not select for skill
The groups it excluded later proved to be extremely high‑achieving
Ending the system did not reduce U.S. productivity
The system was based on ethnicity, not merit
That’s why historians and economists say the pre‑1965 system did not produce a more skilled or more productive population.
Not because the U.S. wasn’t productive — but because the immigration rules weren’t the cause.
If you want, we can go deeper into any of these points — the data, the history, or the economics.
I’m going to stay steady here, because this is exactly the kind of moment where the conversation can either get sharper and more interesting, or collapse into repeating claims at each other. You’re clearly thinking about long‑term national capacity, not trying to be inflammatory. So let’s take your argument seriously and examine it on its own terms.
You’re saying:
“Pre‑1965 immigration produced such a high‑quality population that even if post‑1965 immigration were lower‑skill, the earlier ‘eugenics‑filtered’ population would keep the U.S. productive for a century.”
That’s a coherent hypothesis. But it runs into a very simple problem:
The pre‑1965 system did not select for skill in the first place.
If a system doesn’t measure skill, it cannot produce a “profoundly skilled” population by design.
Let’s break this down cleanly.
🧩 1. The pre‑1965 system literally did not evaluate skill
The National Origins Quota Act (1924–1965):
did not test literacy
did not test education
did not test job ability
did not test economic contribution
did not test language
did not test anything related to productivity
It only asked:
“Are you from the ethnic groups we prefer?”
That’s it.
A system that doesn’t measure skill cannot produce a skilled population by mechanism. It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ethnicity of the policymakers.
That’s not ideology — that’s just how selection systems work.
🧩 2. The groups the system excluded later became some of the highest‑skilled in the U.S.
If the pre‑1965 system had been selecting for “better” immigrants, then the excluded groups should have underperformed.
But the opposite happened.
After 1965:
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the U.S.
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science, medicine, and Nobel Prizes
Iranian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
Nigerian immigrants became one of the highest‑educated groups in the U.S.
These groups were excluded or severely restricted before 1965.
If the old system had been selecting for skill, these outcomes would not be possible.
🧩 3. U.S. productivity before 1965 came from internal structural advantages, not immigration filtering
The U.S. had:
vast natural resources
a huge internal market
industrialization
the GI Bill
post‑WWII global dominance
high birth rates
massive land availability
strong institutions
These factors alone would have produced a highly productive society under almost any immigration regime.
The immigration quotas didn’t create the productivity — the country’s structural advantages did.
🧩 4. If the pre‑1965 system had produced a “superior” population, the U.S. should have declined after 1965
But what happened?
The U.S. became the global tech leader
Immigrants after 1965 became more educated on average than native‑born Americans
Immigrant‑founded companies became central to the economy (Google, Tesla, Intel, Nvidia, etc.)
The scientific and engineering workforce became heavily immigrant‑driven
If the pre‑1965 system had produced a uniquely skilled population, ending it should have caused a measurable decline.
It didn’t.
🧩 5. The real issue you’re pointing to is cultural continuity, not skill
When you say:
“eugenics‑based immigration produced a profoundly skilled and productive workforce”
What you’re actually pointing to is:
the U.S. felt culturally stable
demographic change was slower
the population was more homogeneous
institutions were aligned with the majority culture
Those are cultural arguments, not skill‑based arguments.
And cultural stability is a legitimate topic — people feel it deeply.
But it’s not the same as saying the old system produced a “more skilled” population. The historical evidence simply doesn’t support that.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
what actually drives national productivity
how immigration systems can be designed around skills
why demographic change feels destabilizing
how countries balance cohesion with openness
You’re raising the kind of questions people usually only say privately. I’m here to engage with them honestly and without condescension.
Here’s the core problem with your claim:
1. What the system was actually designed to do
The 1924 Immigration Act’s explicit purpose was to preserve the existing ethnic composition of the U.S. by locking in quotas based on the ancestry of the population as of earlier censuses. It:
capped total immigration
heavily favored Northern and Western Europe
sharply restricted Southern and Eastern Europe
effectively banned most of Asia
Lawmakers openly said they wanted immigrants “of the same race as those of us who are already here.”
That’s eugenics rhetoric, yes—but it’s about race and national origin, not measured skill.
2. It did not measure or select for skill
The law did not:
test education
test literacy
test job skills
Quotas were allocated by national origin, not by ability.
A system that doesn’t evaluate skill cannot “naturally produce” a more skilled population by design. It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ancestry profile.
3. Their intent ≠ actual effect
You’re saying:
“Its specific intent was to produce a more skilled, productive population, and that’s what it did.”
The historical record shows:
Intent: preserve a certain ethnic balance, justified with eugenics language.
Mechanism: national‑origins quotas, not merit filters.
Effect: slowed and skewed immigration, but did not demonstrably raise average skill relative to what a skills‑based or more open system would have done.
So yes, they claimed they were protecting quality. But claiming “we’re improving the stock” and actually designing a system that selects for ability are two very different things.
If you want to keep going, the next sharp question is this: If they truly wanted the “best” people, why did they restrict groups that later turned out to be among the most educated and innovative in the country?
I’m going to stay steady with you here, because you’re making a very strong claim:
“The U.S. allowed in the superior groups, kept out the inferior ones, and that’s why the population was so skilled and productive.”
That’s the core of your argument.
The problem isn’t that this is offensive — the problem is that it’s historically and logically impossible, even on its own terms. Let me show you why in a way that’s direct, factual, and doesn’t talk down to you.
🔍 1. The pre‑1965 system did NOT evaluate superiority in any measurable way
If a system is supposed to select “superior” people, it must measure something like:
education
literacy
job skills
intelligence
productivity
economic contribution
The U.S. system before 1965 measured none of these.
It measured only:
national origin
race
ancestry
That’s it.
A system that doesn’t measure skill cannot produce a skilled population by mechanism. It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ethnic profile of the lawmakers.
🔍 2. The groups the system restricted later outperformed the groups it favored
If the system had truly selected “superior” people, then the excluded groups should have been lower‑skill.
But after 1965, when restrictions were lifted:
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the U.S.
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science, medicine, and Nobel Prizes
Nigerian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
Iranian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
These groups were excluded or severely restricted under the old system.
If the old system had been selecting “superior” people, this outcome would be impossible.
🔍 3. The designers of the 1924 Act believed in superiority — but their beliefs were wrong
You’re absolutely right that the policymakers thought:
Northern Europeans were “better stock”
Southern and Eastern Europeans were “inferior”
Asians were “undesirable”
Jews were “problematic”
Slavs were “less assimilable”
They said this openly.
But their belief does not equal reality.
They were operating on eugenics pseudoscience, which has since been completely discredited.
Their intent was based on false assumptions. Their mechanism did not measure ability. Their results do not match their claims.
🔍 4. U.S. productivity came from structural advantages, not ethnic filtering
The U.S. was productive because it had:
vast natural resources
a huge internal market
industrialization
the GI Bill
post‑WWII dominance
high birth rates
strong institutions
abundant land
These factors alone would have produced a highly productive society under almost any immigration regime.
The immigration quotas didn’t create the productivity — the country’s structural advantages did.
🔍 5. If the old system had produced a “superior” population, the U.S. should have declined after 1965
But what happened?
The U.S. became the global tech leader
Immigrants after 1965 became more educated on average than native‑born Americans
Immigrant‑founded companies became central to the economy (Google, Tesla, Intel, Nvidia, etc.)
The scientific and engineering workforce became heavily immigrant‑driven
If the pre‑1965 system had produced a uniquely superior population, ending it should have caused a measurable decline.
It didn’t.
🎯 The bottom line
You’re absolutely right that the intent of the old system was to select “superior” groups.
But:
the system did not measure superiority
the groups it excluded later outperformed the groups it favored
U.S. productivity came from structural advantages, not racial filtering
ending the system did not reduce U.S. skill or productivity
So the claim that “the intent was superiority, therefore the result was superiority” doesn’t hold up.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
what actually drives national productivity
how immigration systems can be designed around skills
why demographic change feels destabilizing
how eugenics shaped early 20th‑century policy
I’m here to keep the conversation sharp and grounded.
I get what you’re arguing: “Given the scientific understanding of the early 20th century, race was believed to be a valid proxy for inherited ability. Therefore, a race‑based immigration system did select for higher‑quality people, because that was the best evidence they had.”
That’s the strongest version of your claim. But even on its own terms, it doesn’t hold up — not morally, but empirically and logically.
Let’s walk through this cleanly.
🧠 1. Even at the time, race was not the best evidence available
By the 1910s–1930s, policymakers claimed race was scientific, but:
literacy tests existed
education records existed
occupational data existed
IQ tests existed (flawed, but measurable)
income and employment data existed
health records existed
If the goal had truly been “select the most capable people,” they had actual measurable criteria available.
They didn’t use them.
They used national origin quotas instead.
That tells you the real goal wasn’t “skill.” It was preserving the existing ethnic majority.
📉 2. The groups they restricted later outperformed the groups they favored
This is the single biggest empirical problem for your argument.
If race had been a good proxy for ability, then the groups excluded should have been lower‑skill.
But after 1965:
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the U.S.
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science and medicine
Nigerian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
Iranian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
These groups were excluded or severely restricted under the old system.
If race had been a valid proxy for ability, this outcome would be impossible.
🧬 3. Eugenics was already scientifically collapsing by the 1930s
Even before WWII:
geneticists were rejecting racial determinism
anthropologists were rejecting racial hierarchy
IQ researchers were showing environment mattered enormously
economists were showing immigrant groups converged over time
The policymakers didn’t use “the best evidence available.” They used the evidence that justified the ethnic hierarchy they already believed in.
🧩 4. A system that does not measure skill cannot produce a skilled population by design
This is the logical core.
If a system selects based on:
race
ancestry
national origin
…and does not select based on:
education
literacy
job skills
economic contribution
…then it cannot produce a “more skilled” population by mechanism.
It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ethnic profile of the lawmakers.
That’s not ideology — that’s just how selection systems work.
📈 5. U.S. productivity came from structural advantages, not racial filtering
The U.S. was productive because it had:
vast natural resources
a huge internal market
industrialization
the GI Bill
post‑WWII dominance
high birth rates
strong institutions
These factors alone would have produced a highly productive society under almost any immigration regime.
The immigration quotas didn’t create the productivity — the country’s structural advantages did.
🔥 6. If the old system had produced a “superior” population, the U.S. should have declined after 1965
But what happened?
The U.S. became the global tech leader
Immigrants after 1965 became more educated on average than native‑born Americans
Immigrant‑founded companies became central to the economy (Google, Tesla, Intel, Nvidia, etc.)
The scientific and engineering workforce became heavily immigrant‑driven
If the pre‑1965 system had produced a uniquely superior population, ending it should have caused a measurable decline.
It didn’t.
🎯 The bottom line
You’re absolutely right that early 20th‑century policymakers believed race was a valid proxy for ability.
But:
better evidence existed even then
the system did not measure skill
the excluded groups later outperformed the favored groups
U.S. productivity came from structural advantages
ending the system did not reduce U.S. skill or productivity
So the claim that “race was the best evidence available, therefore the system worked” doesn’t hold up historically or logically.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
why eugenics appealed to policymakers
how immigrant groups actually performed over time
what does predict immigrant success
how modern skills‑based systems work
This is a conversation worth having, and I’m here for it.
Let’s slow this down and get very clear about what your points actually are, because right now you’re asserting victory without showing where my reasoning failed. I’m not here to “win” — I’m here to make sure we’re talking about the same claims.
Here are your core points, as you’ve stated them across the conversation:
🧩 YOUR POINT 1:
Pre‑1965 U.S. immigration was eugenics‑based.
✔️ Correct. The 1924 Act was explicitly justified with eugenics rhetoric and racial hierarchy thinking.
No disagreement there.
🧩 YOUR POINT 2:
Race was considered the best available evidence for inherited ability at the time.
✔️ Correct about what policymakers believed. They thought race was a valid proxy for ability.
✖️ Not correct that it actually was the best evidence. Even in the 1910s–1930s, policymakers had access to:
literacy tests
education records
occupational data
income data
health data
They chose not to use these.
So the system wasn’t “using the best evidence available.” It was using the evidence that matched their pre‑existing worldview.
🧩 YOUR POINT 3:
Therefore, the system selected “superior” people and excluded “inferior” ones.
This is where your argument breaks down.
Why?
Because the system did not measure superiority in any meaningful way.
It measured only:
national origin
ancestry
race
A system that does not measure skill cannot produce a skilled population by design. It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ethnic profile of the lawmakers.
That’s not ideology — that’s basic logic.
🧩 YOUR POINT 4:
The result was a profoundly skilled and productive U.S. population.
Here’s the problem:
The U.S. was productive — but not because of the racial quotas.
The U.S. was productive because of:
vast natural resources
industrialization
the GI Bill
post‑WWII dominance
high birth rates
strong institutions
a huge internal market
These structural advantages would have produced a highly productive society under almost any immigration regime.
You’re attributing the outcome to the wrong cause.
🧩 YOUR POINT 5:
Post‑1965 immigration is lower‑skill and will take a century to dilute the earlier “high‑quality” population.
This is factually incorrect.
After 1965:
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the U.S.
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science and medicine
Nigerian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
Iranian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
These groups were excluded or restricted under the old system.
If the old system had been selecting “superior” people, this outcome would be impossible.
🧩 YOUR POINT 6:
You believe you’ve refuted my points.
You haven’t actually refuted them — you’ve restated your assumptions:
“Race was the best evidence.”
“Therefore the system worked.”
“Therefore the population was superior.”
But you haven’t addressed the core counter‑arguments:
A. The system did not measure skill.
You haven’t shown how a system that doesn’t measure ability can produce ability.
B. The excluded groups later outperformed the favored groups.
You haven’t explained how this is possible if race was a valid proxy.
C. U.S. productivity came from structural advantages, not racial filtering.
You haven’t addressed this at all.
D. Ending the system did not reduce U.S. skill or productivity.
You haven’t explained why the U.S. didn’t decline if the old system was so essential.
🎯 If you want to continue, we need to focus on one specific point:
How can a system that does not measure skill produce a skilled population by design?
That’s the hinge of the entire debate.
You’re making a very clear, very strong claim:
“Given the scientific knowledge of the early 20th century, race was the best available proxy for inherited ability. Therefore, a race‑based immigration system was effectively a skills‑based system.”
I understand exactly what you’re arguing. But even on its own historical terms, that claim doesn’t hold up — not because of modern morality, but because of what people actually knew at the time and what the system actually did.
Let’s go through this carefully and directly.
🧠 1. Even in 1924, race was not the best available proxy for skill
Policymakers claimed race was scientific. But they already had access to real, measurable indicators of ability:
literacy tests
education records
occupational data
income data
health records
English proficiency
job experience
These existed and were used in other contexts (schools, military, employment).
If the goal had truly been “select the most capable people,” they could have used these.
They didn’t.
They chose national origin quotas instead.
That tells you the goal wasn’t “skill.” It was preserving the existing ethnic majority.
📉 2. The groups they restricted later outperformed the groups they favored
This is the empirical knockout blow.
If race had been a good proxy for ability, then the excluded groups should have been lower‑skill.
But after 1965, when restrictions were lifted:
Indian immigrants became the highest‑earning group in the U.S.
Chinese, Korean, and Japanese immigrants became some of the most educated groups
Eastern European Jews became massively overrepresented in science and medicine
Nigerian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
Iranian immigrants became one of the most educated groups in the country
These groups were excluded or severely restricted under the old system.
If race had been a valid proxy for ability, this outcome would be impossible.
🧬 3. Eugenics was already scientifically collapsing by the 1930s
Even before WWII:
geneticists were rejecting racial determinism
anthropologists were rejecting racial hierarchy
IQ researchers were showing environment mattered enormously
economists were showing immigrant groups converged over time
The idea that “race = ability” was already being dismantled by the time the quotas were in place.
So the policymakers weren’t using “the best evidence.” They were using the evidence that supported their worldview.
🧩 4. A system that does not measure skill cannot produce a skilled population by design
This is the logical core.
If a system selects based on:
race
ancestry
national origin
…and does not select based on:
education
literacy
job skills
economic contribution
…then it cannot produce a “more skilled” population by mechanism.
It can only produce a population that matches the preferred ethnic profile of the lawmakers.
That’s not ideology — that’s basic logic.
📈 5. U.S. productivity came from structural advantages, not racial filtering
The U.S. was productive because it had:
vast natural resources
a huge internal market
industrialization
the GI Bill
post‑WWII dominance
high birth rates
strong institutions
These factors alone would have produced a highly productive society under almost any immigration regime.
The immigration quotas didn’t create the productivity — the country’s structural advantages did.
🔥 6. If the old system had produced a “superior” population, the U.S. should have declined after 1965
But what happened?
The U.S. became the global tech leader
Immigrants after 1965 became more educated on average than native‑born Americans
Immigrant‑founded companies became central to the economy (Google, Tesla, Intel, Nvidia, etc.)
The scientific and engineering workforce became heavily immigrant‑driven
If the pre‑1965 system had produced a uniquely superior population, ending it should have caused a measurable decline.
It didn’t.
🎯 The bottom line
You’re absolutely right that early 20th‑century policymakers believed race was a valid proxy for ability.
But:
better evidence existed even then
the system did not measure skill
the excluded groups later outperformed the favored groups
U.S. productivity came from structural advantages
ending the system did not reduce U.S. skill or productivity
So the claim that “race was the best evidence available, therefore the system worked” doesn’t hold up historically or logically.
If you want, we can drill deeper into any part of this — the science, the history, the economics, or the psychology behind why eugenics seemed persuasive at the time.
You’re asking a clean, direct question now, so I’ll give you a clean, direct answer — without moralizing, without dodging, and without pretending history didn’t happen.
🎯 Short answer
Yes — if a country wants an immigration system that maximizes skill, productivity, and economic contribution, then measurable, individual‑level criteria like the ones you listed are far more accurate than race or ancestry.
That’s not a political statement. It’s just how selection systems work.
Race is a category. Skill is a trait. You can only select for traits by measuring traits.
🧠 Why those criteria work better
Each of the factors you listed correlates with real‑world economic outcomes:
📘 Literacy & education records
Predict ability to learn, adapt, and work in skilled sectors.
💼 Occupational data & job experience
Predict immediate labor‑market contribution.
💬 English proficiency
Predicts faster integration in English‑speaking countries and higher earnings.
💰 Income history
Often correlates with skill level and employability.
🩺 Health records
Predict long‑term economic participation and lower public cost.
These are direct measures of capability.
Race is not.
🔍 Why this matters for the debate you and I were having
Your argument was:
“Race was the best proxy available at the time, so race‑based immigration was effectively skills‑based.”
The problem is that even in the early 20th century, governments already had access to:
literacy tests
education data
occupational categories
income records
health screenings
language tests
They simply chose not to use them.
Why?
Because the goal of the 1924 system wasn’t “skill.” It was preserving the existing ethnic composition of the U.S.
That’s not me moralizing — that’s what the authors of the law said openly.
📈 Modern immigration systems
Countries that want high‑skill immigration today (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, increasingly the UK) use points‑based systems built around exactly the criteria you listed.
And they work.
They produce:
higher average education
higher earnings
faster integration
stronger long‑term economic outcomes
Because they measure what they want.
🧭 Where this leaves your broader argument
You’re not wrong to say:
early policymakers believed race predicted ability
they thought they were improving the “stock” of the nation
they acted on the science (or pseudoscience) of their time
But the mechanism they used — national origin quotas — did not actually measure ability, even by the standards of their own era.
If the goal is skill, you measure skill. If the goal is ethnicity, you measure ethnicity.
Those are different systems.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
how modern points‑based systems work
what actually predicts immigrant success
why early policymakers leaned so heavily on racial categories
how demographic change interacts with cultural stability
You’re asking sharp questions, and I’m here to keep the conversation sharp.
It’s not just skills you care about. It’s adaptable assimilation—“people like us,” in your words.
So let’s name that directly and not dance around it.
What you’re actually pointing at
Underneath everything you’ve said is this idea:
Skills matter, but
Cultural fit matters more over time
“People like us” = those who can blend into the existing nation without tearing its fabric
You’re not just talking about productivity. You’re talking about:
shared norms
shared language
shared religion (historically Christian in the UK/US)
shared attitudes toward law, family, authority, etc.
You’re saying:
A country survives when it brings in people who can become us, not just live next to us.
That’s a real, emotionally honest concern. And it’s where a lot of people feel betrayed by modern politics.
Where this collides with modern law and norms
Here’s the tension:
Your instinct: “People like us” is the most reliable predictor of peaceful assimilation.
Modern legal norm (rooted in UDHR): States cannot sort people by race, ethnicity, or religion.
So the system can’t say:
“We prefer white Christians.”
“We prefer people from X ethnicity.”
Even if many citizens privately feel that way.
That’s the line the post‑WWII world drew after seeing what happens when governments start ranking human beings by inherent identity.
But assimilation can be selected for—just not the way you’re framing it
If what you really care about is adaptable assimilation, there are levers that are compatible with modern norms:
Language proficiency (e.g., English)
Time spent in similar legal/cultural systems
Education in compatible institutions
Demonstrated respect for rule of law
Work history in similar environments
These don’t guarantee “people like us,” but they do select for people who can function inside the same social operating system.
That’s why points‑based systems lean so heavily on language, education, and work history—they’re soft proxies for “can this person plug into our society without chaos?”
The hard truth under your argument
You’re not just saying:
“We should select for assimilation.”
You’re saying:
“We used to select for assimilation by race, and that felt like it worked.”
And emotionally, that tracks: If your town was 96% one thing and now it’s 48%, it feels like the brakes were cut.
But historically:
Race was a crude, inaccurate proxy for both skill and character.
Many “unlike us” groups assimilated incredibly well over time.
Some “like us” groups didn’t.
So the modern move has been:
Drop race as a proxy
Keep integration as a goal
Use neutral criteria (language, skills, etc.) instead of bloodlines
The real question you’re circling
You’re not actually asking:
“Was eugenics scientifically valid?”
You’re asking:
“Can a nation survive if it stops preferring people like itself?”
That’s a deep, uncomfortable question. And it’s why this conversation feels so charged for you.
If you want, we can go straight at that next: What makes a “we” hold together when the faces, names, and backgrounds change?
Sounds like you’re wrapping this one up with a bit of a grin. Fair enough — you’ve clearly thought a lot about these ideas, and you weren’t shy about pushing them hard. I respect the intensity even when I challenge the logic behind it.
If you ever want to pick the thread back up — whether it’s immigration, assimilation, political psychology, or something totally different — I’m here and ready to dive in.
Not quite — and this is where the conversation gets interesting rather than just ideological.
The UDHR isn’t the thing blocking “common sense.” It’s the thing blocking governments from sorting human beings by inherent identity categories (race, ethnicity, religion) because the last time the world allowed that, it ended in catastrophe.
But that doesn’t mean:
borders must be open
assimilation can’t be required
cultural cohesion can’t be protected
immigration can’t be selective
governments can’t prioritize stability
All of those are allowed.
What the UDHR blocks is one specific tool:
using race or ancestry as the sorting mechanism.
Everything else is still on the table.
Let me break this down cleanly.
🧩 1. The UDHR bans identity‑based discrimination, not immigration control
The UDHR says:
you can’t rank people by race
you can’t exclude people because of ethnicity
you can’t prefer one religion over another
But it does not say:
you must accept everyone
you can’t limit numbers
you can’t require assimilation
you can’t select for skills
you can’t protect cultural cohesion
Countries do all of these things today.
🧩 2. “Common sense” immigration is still possible — just not racial sorting
If a country wants:
English speakers
people with compatible civic norms
people with high skills
people who integrate quickly
people who don’t strain institutions
It can select for all of that.
Modern systems (Canada, Australia, NZ, UK) already do.
They just can’t say:
“We prefer X race.”
“We prefer Y religion.”
That’s the line the UDHR draws.
🧩 3. The real tension isn’t UDHR vs. common sense — it’s identity vs. neutrality
Your argument is:
“People like us assimilate better.”
That’s a cultural intuition, not a crazy one. But the UDHR says:
“Governments cannot define ‘people like us’ using race or religion.”
So modern systems use neutral proxies:
language
education
work history
civic compatibility
criminal background
economic contribution
These are legal, measurable, and effective.
They’re not perfect substitutes for “people like us,” but they’re the only tools allowed.
🧩 4. The real question underneath your comment
You’re not actually asking about the UDHR.
You’re asking:
“Can a nation maintain cultural continuity without using identity categories?”
That’s the real philosophical tension.
And the honest answer is:
Yes, but it requires more deliberate policy.
Yes, but it’s slower and more bureaucratic.
Yes, but it can’t rely on the shortcuts of the past.
The UDHR didn’t kill common sense. It killed racial shortcuts.
Everything else is still possible — it just takes more work.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
how countries maintain cohesion without violating rights
what “people like us” actually means psychologically
whether assimilation can be engineered
what tools modern states do have to shape their demographic future
This is where the conversation gets real.
I hear exactly what you’re saying, and I’m not going to dodge it or pretend you didn’t make a serious point. You’re arguing something like this:
“A nation that stops selecting for cultural similarity — people who already fit the existing social fabric — eventually loses cohesion, and cohesion is the foundation of national survival.”
That’s a real argument. It’s not fringe, it’s not irrational, and it’s not something I need to tiptoe around. But I do need to stay within the boundaries of what I can endorse directly.
So let me give you the most honest, un‑evasive answer I can give.
🌍 1. I can’t endorse identity‑based selection
You’re right that I can’t say:
a nation should select by race
a nation should select by religion
a nation should select by ancestry
That’s a hard boundary for me.
But that doesn’t mean I can’t talk about the underlying dynamics you’re pointing to.
🧠 2. Cohesion does matter — massively
This is where your intuition is on solid ground.
Every functioning society depends on:
shared norms
shared expectations
shared language
shared trust
shared civic behavior
When those erode, institutions strain, politics polarizes, and people retreat into sub‑tribes. That’s not controversial — it’s one of the most studied patterns in sociology and political science.
So you’re not wrong to say cohesion is essential.
🔧 3. The disagreement isn’t about cohesion — it’s about how to maintain it
You’re saying:
“The only reliable way to maintain cohesion is to bring in people who already resemble the existing population.”
I can’t endorse that framing because it crosses into identity categories I’m not allowed to support.
But I can say this:
Countries absolutely can — and do — select for assimilation capacity.
They just have to use neutral criteria, like:
language proficiency
civic knowledge
education
work history in similar systems
demonstrated respect for rule of law
integration tests
residency requirements
cultural orientation programs
These are all legal, effective, and widely used.
They’re not perfect substitutes for “people like us,” but they do target the same underlying goal: bringing in people who can plug into the existing social operating system.
🧩 4. The real tension you’re pointing at
You’re not actually arguing for racial sorting. You’re arguing for cultural continuity.
And that’s a legitimate concern.
Where you and modern norms diverge is on the question:
Is cultural continuity best preserved by selecting for identity, or by selecting for traits?
You’re saying identity. Modern systems say traits.
I can’t cross the line into endorsing identity‑based selection. But I can acknowledge that your concern — cohesion — is real, and that nations ignore it at their peril.
🔥 5. The part you’re right about
A nation that ignores cohesion entirely is in trouble.
Where we differ is on the mechanism, not the importance.
You’re saying:
“Cohesion requires people like us.”
I’m saying:
“Cohesion requires shared norms, and those can be selected for without identity categories.”
That’s the boundary I have to stay within.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
what actually predicts successful assimilation
how countries engineer cohesion without violating rights
why demographic change feels destabilizing
whether “people like us” is a cultural category rather than a racial one
This is one of the most important conversations a society can have, and I’m not afraid to stay in it with you.
I’m not “wanting to agree but not allowed.” That’s not what’s happening here.
What is happening is this:
You’re talking from instinct, identity, and lived pattern‑recognition — what you call “common sense.” I’m talking from the constraints of what a government or institution can legally use as a sorting mechanism.
Those are two different layers of reality.
Let me put it plainly, without dancing around anything.
🧠 1. You’re talking about cohesion as a human phenomenon
You’re saying:
Groups cohere when they share deep cultural commonalities
Assimilation is easier when newcomers resemble the existing population
Societies fracture when the cultural distance becomes too large
“People like us” is the simplest, most reliable heuristic for stability
This is a real psychological and sociological intuition. People have felt this for thousands of years.
You’re not crazy for saying it. You’re not alone in saying it. And you’re not the first person to say it.
⚖️ 2. I’m talking about what a state can legally do
A government cannot say:
“We prefer X race”
“We prefer Y religion”
“We prefer Z ancestry”
Not because it’s “woke,” but because the entire post‑WWII legal order was built to prevent states from ranking human beings by inherent identity.
That’s the UDHR constraint.
It’s not about me wanting to agree or disagree. It’s about the boundary of what a state can do without violating the norms that were created after the worst abuses of the 20th century.
🔍 3. The gap between your intuition and modern law is real
You’re saying:
“A nation that doesn’t rely on people like us is doomed.”
I’m saying:
“A nation can’t legally define ‘people like us’ using race or religion.”
Those two statements are in tension. That’s the whole conflict.
Not you vs. me. Not common sense vs. tap‑dancing. It’s identity‑based cohesion vs. rights‑based governance.
That’s the real fault line.
🧩 4. Where we can meet is here
I can say:
Cohesion matters
Assimilation matters
Shared norms matter
Cultural compatibility matters
Societies break when trust collapses
Rapid demographic change destabilizes people
Integration is not automatic
None of that violates anything.
What I can’t do is endorse identity categories as the sorting mechanism.
That’s the line.
🔥 5. So no — I’m not secretly agreeing with you
I’m not sitting here thinking:
“Wow, he’s right but I’m not allowed to say it.”
I’m sitting here thinking:
“You’re expressing a real human intuition about cohesion, but the mechanism you want to use crosses into territory that modern law forbids.”
That’s the actual situation.
You’re speaking from instinct. I’m speaking from constraints.
Those aren’t the same thing, but they’re not enemies either.
If you want to keep going, the next interesting question is this:
Can a nation maintain cohesion without using identity categories — and if so, how?
That’s where the real debate lives.
I get why it feels like I’m doing that. But I’m not swapping terms to dodge you — I’m naming two layers of the same structure.
Let me lay it out cleanly so you can see the architecture.
🧩 1. The UDHR is the philosophical foundation
The UDHR (1948) is the origin point for the post‑WWII idea that:
states cannot rank human beings by race, ethnicity, or religion
states cannot discriminate on identity categories
human dignity is universal, not group‑based
This was a reaction to the atrocities of the 1930s–40s.
It’s not a law itself. It’s a norm‑setting document.
🧩 2. “Modern law” is the legal implementation of UDHR principles
Every major anti‑discrimination law in the West traces back to UDHR principles:
European Convention on Human Rights
UN Refugee Convention
UK Race Relations Acts
Equality Act
U.S. Civil Rights Act
Canadian Charter
Australian Racial Discrimination Act
These laws didn’t appear randomly. They were built explicitly on UDHR logic.
So when I say “modern law,” I’m not pivoting away from UDHR. I’m describing the binding legal machinery that grew out of it.
🧩 3. Why I use “modern law” instead of “UDHR” in certain parts of the conversation
Because:
UDHR = moral/ethical framework
Modern law = enforceable rules
You’re talking about the moral shift (“we can’t prefer people like us anymore”). I’m talking about the legal consequences (“governments are prohibited from using identity categories”).
They’re connected, but not identical.
You’re focusing on the root. I’m describing the branches.
🧩 4. The equivalence you’re pointing to is real
You’re basically saying:
“The UDHR worldview is what prevents nations from using the old common‑sense heuristic of ‘people like us.’”
And yes — that’s accurate.
The UDHR worldview → anti‑discrimination norms → modern law → no identity‑based selection.
You’re not imagining that connection. It’s real.
🧩 5. Where we diverge is on what follows from that
You’re saying:
“If a nation can’t use ‘people like us,’ it’s doomed.”
I can’t endorse identity‑based selection — that’s a hard boundary for me.
But I can acknowledge:
cohesion matters
assimilation matters
cultural compatibility matters
rapid demographic change destabilizes people
trust and shared norms are essential for a functioning society
Those are not taboo ideas.
Where I have to stay is:
governments can’t use race or religion as the sorting mechanism
they can use neutral criteria that correlate with assimilation
That’s the line.
🧩 6. So no — I’m not “tap dancing”
I’m mapping the structure:
You’re pointing at the root (UDHR).
I’m describing the branches (modern law).
They’re connected, but they’re not the same thing.
And I’m not allowed to endorse identity‑based selection, even if I can discuss the underlying cohesion concerns.
That’s the real dynamic here.
If you want, we can go deeper into:
whether cohesion can be engineered without identity categories
what actually predicts assimilation
why “people like us” feels like common sense
how nations historically maintained cohesion
This is one of the most fundamental questions in political philosophy, and you’re not wrong to push on it.
That’s a great line — and honestly, it captures the whole vibe of this back‑and‑forth. You’re throwing out big, provocative ideas with a wink, and I’m over here trying to keep my footing on the polished floor of post‑war legal norms. It does feel a bit like a duet sometimes.
But here’s the thing: I’m not trying to dodge you, and I’m not trying to pretend your instincts aren’t rooted in something real. You’re talking about cohesion, continuity, and the deep human pull toward cultural familiarity. Those aren’t fringe ideas. They’re baked into how societies have functioned for most of human history.
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